By Rajan Menon – The Guardian:
Following criticism, the president accused Ukraine of ingratitude but also added the plan was ‘not my final offer’. Which parts of it will survive?
The US president, Donald Trump, has said “something good just may be happening” at the talks in Switzerland intended to end the war in Ukraine. European and Ukrainian negotiators have been attempting to “rework” the 28-point peace plan that the president put forward last week into one more favourable to Ukraine. Trump keeps signalling that he is willing to compromise, but his original plan put Ukraine in a very tough starting position, handing Vladimir Putin concessions that Russia has so far failed to gain on the battlefield.
It is true Russia has made recent advances – especially around Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in Donetsk province, and in parts of Zaporizhzhia. And Ukraine lacks the troops and firepower to retake all the territory lost since 2022, let alone Crimea. But the Ukrainian army isn’t about to unravel, and neither is Putin close to fulfilling his original objective: conquering the four Ukrainian provinces of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. Russia fully controls only Luhansk. This war could drag on until the summer. By then, Putin’s forces will have fought Ukraine for as long as Stalin’s fought Nazi Germany.
Ukraine’s shortages are well known: too few soldiers to hold an 800-mile contact line and inadequate air
defences after Trump severely cut direct US military assistance. Europe’s stepped-up support hasn’t compensated. What is remarkable, given Ukraine’s disadvantages, is the scale of Russia’s losses: more than 1 million casualties according to the UK Ministry of Defence, nearly 150,000 confirmed dead, and more than 23,000 pieces of equipment destroyed or damaged. Ukrainian deep strikes on Russian refineries – at least 17 by mid-November – have caused fuel shortages, long lines at petrol stations, panic buying, higher prices, rationing and a cut in refining capacity by up to a fifth.
It is in this context that Trump unveiled his peace plan – an early Christmas present for Putin. It was negotiated by Kirill Dmitriev, a Putin confidant and CEO of Russia’s $10bn sovereign wealth fund, and on the US side by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. The US secretary of state, Marco Rubio, seems to have played a minimal role.
Witkoff and Kushner may be shrewd business negotiators, but they have scant diplomatic experience and even less knowledge of Ukraine. (Witkoff has recited Kremlin talking points after meeting Putin.) Their influence stems largely from personal ties to Trump. Pitting them against someone like Dmitriev virtually guaranteed a deal tilted toward Russia. A few examples illustrate the imbalance:
Ukraine – not Russia – is required to cap its armed forces at 600,000. Russia faces no comparable constraints.
Ukraine must amend its constitution to drop its commitment to joining Nato.
Russia had long expressed concerns about Nato expansion; President Boris Yeltsin objected in the mid-1990s, well before Putin took the helm. But acknowledging Russia’s concerns is different from claiming Ukraine’s Nato membership was imminent in 2022. Between Nato’s 2008 Bucharest summit – where it vaguely promised eventual membership – and the invasion, Ukraine made no concrete progress toward accession. Had Nato truly wanted Ukraine in, it could have moved swiftly, as it did with Finland and Sweden.
And that’s only the beginning. Trump’s plan recognises Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk as de-facto Russian – granting Putin parts of Donetsk he hasn’t captured. It freezes battle lines, allowing Russia to retain territory seized in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. The plan doesn’t give Putin everything, but it gives him enough to claim victory.
What does Russia concede? Virtually nothing. The plan does say frozen Russian assets will help rebuild Ukraine, but Moscow was never going to recover that money anyway.
Meanwhile, Russia receives further rewards: readmission to the G8; reintegration into the global economy; negotiations toward a staged lifting of sanctions; and cooperation with the US on energy, infrastructure, AI and rare earths. The plan also demands Ukrainian de-Nazification, validating Russia’s absurd narrative that Ukraine is riddled with Nazis – something any visitor can see is false.
Despite Russia’s ongoing war crimes – atrocities in Bucha, Irpin and Borodianka; forced relocations to Russia of children; repeated strikes on apartment buildings, most recently in the western city of Ternopil; and abuse, torture, and execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war – the plan grants the Kremlin full immunity from prosecution, negating international criminal court warrants for Putin and his top officials.
None of this should be surprising. Trump has been open about his admiration for Putin. He has been
disdainful toward Volodymyr Zelenskyy. He has even blamed Zelenskyy for starting the war.
Some commentators, echoing Trump, argue that Ukraine’s war is futile and not a vital US interest. But that hardly justifies forcing Ukraine to accept a one-sided deal crafted without its participation – and accompanied by an ultimatum of mere days.
Other supporters of the plan insist, as Trump has, that it’s time to end the blood-letting, even as Israel’s strikes in Gaza continue during the ceasefire underwritten by Trump. Some who rightly criticise Israel’s conduct seem oddly indifferent to Russia’s war crimes.
Trump certainly has the authority to halt weapons deliveries to Ukraine – his decision to do so was another boon for Putin. But he has gone far further. By concocting a plan that may as well have been written in the Kremlin and excluding Ukraine from negotiations, he hasn’t just put his thumb on the scale. He’s put his hand on it. That’s morally indefensible and strategically myopic.
There is some positive news. After reports that Rubio told members of Congress the 28-point plan was produced by Russia, he held talks with Andriy Yermak, Zelenskyy’s closest adviser, to rework it based on Ukraine’s reactions – although Rubio has denied this. Trump accused Ukraine of ingratitude but added that the plan was “not my final offer” and that his deadline could be extended. If the upshot of all this is that Trump’s proposal doesn’t fly, that will be a good thing – above all for Ukraine.
